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Nico Stehr e Marian Adolf
There are some things which cannot be purchased with wealth, and knowl-
edge is one of them. Wealth can purchase houses, lands, adherents, and 
bauble honors, and a man may sit down and enjoy these things at once. 
An heir to an empire may be born, he may be the legal successor to thrones, 
armies, and navies; over these he may exercise dominion and be their pos-
sessor, but no man was ever born an heir to knowledge1. 
This article addresses the apparently rather old question – as the citation from the 
1851 issue of the Scientific American indicates – of how to assess and measure the 
value or price of knowledge. We will probe the issue from a variety of social scien-
tific and practical perspectives. Against the background of a sociological concept of 
knowledge economic, political, social and juridical perspectives are discussed that 
may lead us to a price of knowledge. 
We observe as is widely assumed that knowledge plays an ever-greater role within 
as well as across economies and politics and that its embodiment makes it difficult 
to divorce it from its carriers, if at all; and that knowledge is deeply entrenched in 
questions of social relations and stratification and last but not least that knowledge 
is subject to depreciation, decay or obsolescence2. As such, it cannot presumably 
1. “Knowledge is democratic”. Scientific American, 6, pp. 253-253 (26 April 1851).
2. The obsolescence of knowledge in general is an important but hardly well understood process. The 
impact of knowledge that becomes obsolete on the wages and earning of employees is an equally com-
plicated issue (Rosen, 1975; Welch e Ureta, 2002). 
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be captured in a straightforward manner, using either market-based tools or non-
market evaluations especially given the persistent standoff between its individual, 
economic and public relevancies and benefits. A simple arithmetic of the price of 
knowledge fails.
Point of departure
We begin our study by pointing to some of the pitfalls of establishing exactly 
what theorists and practitioners are dealing with when they define the phenomenon, 
especially if they do so from an economist’s perspective: can knowledge actually be 
measured, and if so, is it really knowledge that is the referent?3 Second, we deal with 
attempts to specify and quantify “human capital” as forms of knowledge assets by 
examining various approaches from within the field of economics. Third, we turn 
to a more sociological viewpoint in determining symbolic and knowledge capital. 
Discussing Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital as a form of symbolic capital, 
we find that it is insufficient to capture the ambivalent role knowledge plays in the 
processes of social stratification and empowerment. In a fourth step towards encir-
cling attempts to put a price on knowledge, we deal with patents and other forms of 
intellectual property rights (ipr) that play an increasing role in today’s economies. 
Fifth, in an attempt to find yet another proxy for evaluating the price of knowledge, 
the concluding chapter turns to politics and the question of taxation, in particular 
the public funding of education. Based on Dewey’s classic question of how much 
knowledge a democracy requires of its citizens, we use the case of a political-legal 
dispute to approach the question of what knowledge is worth and how much of it 
we should afford. Sixth, we discuss the notion of additional knowledge, starting out 
from the assumption that added knowledge should be of specific value. Seventh, we 
examine the idea found in the economics literature that commodities are embed-
ded knowledge. Finally, given our tentative conclusion that establishing the price 
of knowledge is a rather difficult task we turn to the idea of knowledge as a public 
good. It is an essential attribute of the concept of public goods that for those who 
consume them their price is negligible if not altogether absent.
3. Heather Rimes and her colleagues (2014, p. 154) argue that a market-base price of knowledge does 
not correspond to the “true” value of knowledge; the true value of knowledge “lies in how often and 
how widely is it applied – information that is not captured in market price […] the value of knowledge 
derives from the intensity and the range of its use”. This obviously is a helpful hint, however, it perhaps 
only increases the obstacles of arriving at an evaluation of knowledge, past and present and does not 
remove the difficulties we will describe in quantifying the price of knowledge.
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Measuring knowledge
Unlike general social labour, knowledge is impossible to 
translate into – or measure in – simple abstracts units. It is 
not reducible to a quantity of abstract labour of which it can 
be said to be the equivalent, the outcome or the product.
André Gorz ([2003] 2010, p. 35)
The economist Herbert Simon (1999, p. 24) is much more upbeat than André 
Gorz about our ability to develop robust measures of knowledge. Simon emphati-
cally stresses that all aspects of knowledge “can be (and have been) analyzed with 
the tools of economics. Knowledge has a price and a cost of production; there are 
markets for knowledge, with their supply and demand curves, and marginal rates 
of substitution between one form of knowledge and another”. However, Simon 
(Idem) at least partly retracts his strong statement about the rigor with which the 
tools of economics can be applied by pointing out that knowledge “is simply one 
among the many commodities in which our economy trades, albeit one of large and 
rapidly growing importance. It requires special treatment only because of its special 
properties”4. Let us take a closer look at how these “special properties” of knowledge 
are dealt with from within economics.
Our examination of the mainly economics literature5 that proclaims to deal with 
the value or price of knowledge as an asset and the monetary return to knowledge 
exemplifies two assertions: First, our general contention that the terms of knowledge 
and information are, once again (Adolf e Stehr, 2014, p. 25f ), liberally conflated 
(e.g. Hess e Ostrom, 2003). Gary Becker (1994a, p. 53)6, for example, notes that 
4. Kenneth Boulding, like Herbert Simon, believes that knowledge can be a commodity. However, Boul-
ding (1996, p. 2) is more reluctant in his conviction that knowledge can become a commodity. He 
points to a number of fundamental difficulties, which we will also discover in treating knowledge as a 
commodity: “It is a little hard to put [the label commodity] on it because of the difficulties of measur-
ing the quantity of the commodity itself […] The absence of any unit of knowledge itself, however, and 
perhaps the intrinsic heterogeneity of its substance, make it very difficult to think of a price of knowl-
edge as such, and indeed has probably contributed to a certain resistance of thinking of knowledge as 
a commodity”.
5. Samuli Leppälä (2015) summarizes the intellectual origins and the defining characteristics of the 
economic analysis of knowledge, employing the “standard epistemological definition” of knowledge 
as “justified belief ”. It is also noteworthy that Leppälä does not raise the issue of the price or value 
of knowledge in his survey of the diverse economics literature that attends to the economic role of 
knowledge.
6. The conceptual discussion of the so-called data-information-knowledge-wisdom hierarchy (dikw) in 
the social systems literature (for example, Ackoff, 1989) explicitly offers to separate the phenomena in 
the form of a pyramid by referring to progressively smaller layers until one reaches the state of wisdom. 
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increased knowledge raises the real income of individuals and specifies his hypothesis 
by saying: “information about the prices charged by different sellers would enable 
a person to buy from the cheapest, thereby raising his command over resources; 
information about the wages offered by different firms would enable him to work 
for the firm paying the highest (our emphasis)”7. 
Second, we find that efforts by economists that remain and are genuinely con-
cerned with the value of knowledge, for example in the sense of knowledge assets 
as “intangibles”, for the most part display a strongly ambivalent idea of the value of 
knowledge and indicate strong doubts about the possibility of arriving at a price of 
knowledge. Such ambivalence contrasts of course with the massive affirmation in the 
literature that human resources of an organization as well as investments – at a rate 
close to the investment in tangibles – in research and development, software, brands, 
and other intangibles are the key to sustainable competitive advantages. As a result 
measures of the Gross National Product (gdp) that does not include all intangible 
investments misrepresent the actual changes in output (McGrattan, 2017). Yet, little 
has been done to actually capture the accountable value of such assets. 
Although they are deemed as critically important for firms in the contemporary 
competitive economic environment, the very definition of intangibles as “unseen 
wealth” (Blair e Wallman, 2001; Leadbeater, 1999; Teece, 1998)8 already indicates 
the difficulties of devising ways of measuring the monetary value of copyrights, 
patents, trade secrets, brand loyalty, organizational capabilities – let alone knowl-
edge skills (see Fulmer e Ployhart, 2014) or human capital. Carol Corrado und ihre 
Kollegen (2006, p. 3) verweisen aber allgemein darauf, sofern “the factors typically 
associated with the growth of the ‘knowledge economy’ assume a greater importance 
once intangibles are included”9.
For instance, as one “processes” data you get information and so on. Since the various steps within the 
pyramid are far from clear cut, in the end the proposal amounts to another conflation of the various 
parts that make up the dikw pyramid.
7. On the other hand, Olivier Gossner (2010, p. 95) matter-of-factly states: “‘knowledge’ refers to the 
information possessed by the agent”.
8. In his discussion of “the nature of capital” more than a century ago, Thorstein Veblen ([1908] 1919, pp. 
325-326) refers to part of the capital of a community as “immaterial equipment” or “intangible assets” 
mainly consisting of knowledge and information that “in the early days at least, […] is far and away the 
most important and consequential category of the community’s assets or equipment”. 
9. “We find that the inclusion of intangibles makes a significant difference in the measured pattern of eco-
nomic growth: the growth rates of output and of output-per worker are found to increase at a noticeably 
more rapid rate when intangibles are included than under the baseline case in which intangible capital is 
completely ignored, and capital deepening (when expanded to include both tangibles and intangibles) 
becomes the unambiguously dominant source of growth in labor productivity” (Corrado, Hulten e 
Sichel, 2006, p. 3).
The price of knowledge, pp. 179-232
183Abril   2018
Moreover, at least in the United States, the widely accepted accounting prin-
ciples (Gaap) that govern the reporting of financial information to external sources 
prohibit companies from recording the value of human capital resources as assets10. 
Instead, human capital expenses are recorded as expenditures (Tan, 2014). Since 
the expenditures for and the values of human capital might not correspond, the 
actual price of human capital assets remains a mystery. By virtue of the difficulties 
inherent to determining the exact value of intangible goods and services, the validity 
and comparability of national indicators of the total economy, work productivity 
and goods distribution are uncertain and even doubtful (McCulla, Holden e Smith, 
2013; Feldsein, 2017).
Such ambivalence or lack of precision (how profitable is private investment in 
research and development?) perhaps exemplifies and satisfies the numerous critics 
who are convinced that knowledge does not or should not carry a price tag and 
instead be part of the “public domain” (Boyle, 2003), or that it is particularly ill 
suited for conversion to private property and market pricing11. To begin with, there-
fore, we are able to assert that there is – as in the case of the social phenomenon of 
power – no standardized or objective approach to quantify the value of knowledge 
(or information). 
Even assuming that one is able to specify a price, the value of knowledge will 
not be a constant but is likely to increase or decay (become obsolete), depending 
on circumstances such as the time that has passed since the initial discovery of a 
product, the difficulty of keeping it from other agents (the case of generic drugs) 
10. But why are human capital resources not recognized by U.S. accounting standards as accountable 
for the purpose of financial statements? As pointed out in Sollosy, McInerney, and Braun (2016, p. 
23) the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board “requires, among other things, that in order for 
an asset to be recognized for financial statement purposes, the future benefits of the resource must 
be under the control of the organization and that they be reliably measurable”. This position has not 
remained without its strong critics (e.g. Fulmer e Ployhart, 2013, or Lim et al., 2010). What remains 
is the persistent appeal by accounting specialist’s, “has not the time come to seriously consider how 
to best reflect the value of intangible assets in a manner that allows for the comparison of competing 
organizations within an industry?” (Sollosy, McInerney, and Braun (2016, p. 224). For the time be-
ing, it remains the case that “in the wake of the growth of intangible assets the ultimate measure of 
firm value, share prices, has become largely divorced from (historical) accounting measures” (Bryan, 
Rafferty e Wigan, 2017, p. 63).
11. After all, the doubt expressed toward efforts to monetarize knowledge sometimes even refers to 
Socrates teaching his students without demanding any monetary compensation. Socrates expressed 
nothing but malice for teachers who claimed to be able to generate a lofty income from their wealthy 
students. But what was the reason for Socrates to refuse to take money in return for knowledge? If 
he charged for his teaching, Socrates maintained, he would be forced to teach students he did not 
appreciate; in other words, he wanted to protect his liberty (see Bertram Schefold, “Die Ökonomis-
ierung der Wissenskultur” [The economisation of the culture of knowledge]. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, April 12, 2010). 
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or the assets that have to be mobilized to transmit it (Pakes e Schankerman, 1979). 
In our attempt to reconstruct various perspectives that aim to gain insight into the 
value of knowledge we will cover three cases that suggest that the value of knowledge 
is at issue in these discussions, decisions, or valuations of the benefits to be derived 
from knowledge. 
The accounts that are of interest to us either attempt to gain insight into the 
value of knowledge by treating knowledge as a form of input, for example, in the 
production process, and as one of the factors of production such as human capital. 
Another notable approach takes the opposite perspective. In this case, knowledge 
becomes relevant and hence subject to attempts to value it by being treated as a form 
of output, for example in the sense of patents, copyright restrictions and the like.
Many of the studies and discussions that can be found in the literature that claims 
to deal with the price of knowledge actually are about the price of information (e.g. 
Rosewall, 2005). This is most notable in consumer behavior research, which examines 
the impact of consumers’ knowledge of the price of a product/commodity on the 
decisions made by them in supermarkets (e.g. Olavarrieta et al., 2012; Dickson e 
Sawyer, 1990), the effect the product price has on consumer satisfaction (e.g. Hom-
burg et al., 2012), the level of price knowledge that children hold (Damay, Guichard 
e Clauzel (2014), the impact of the price of tertiary education on university students 
(e.g. Junor e Usher, 2004-2005). 
Most other efforts that aim to discuss the price of knowledge can be subsumed 
under some form of a critique of the commodification of knowledge; these efforts 
are mainly critical on the grounds that scientific and economic activities are embed-
ded in distinct functional subsystems of society. 
It is in this context that the nature and the influence of the work of Jean-François 
Lyotard on our present-day understanding of the role of knowledge as a commod-
ity deserves to be introduced into our discussion. A prominent example of the idea 
that our age is characterized by a growing commodification of knowledge may be 
found in Jean-François Lyotard’s ([1979], p. 1) La condition postmoderne. Lyotard 
offers the working hypothesis that the status of knowledge has beginning on the 
1950s been altered “as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and 
cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age”. Lyotard refers in this context 
to the standard text by Daniel Bell or Alain Touraine about the emergence of post-
industrial economies. Lyotard ([1979], p. 4) offers the following observations about 
the fate of knowledge in the modern age:
We may […] expect a thorough exteriorisation of knowledge with respect to the “knower”, 
at whatever point he or she may occupy in the knowledge process. The old principle that 
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the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even 
of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so. The relationships of the 
suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and 
will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity 
producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume – that is, the form 
of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed 
in order to be valorised in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. 
Knowledge looses its early dominant “use-value” and its value is reduced to its 
“exchange-value”, that is, the commercialization of knowledge. The point of departure 
in discussions about the commodification of knowledge, then, tends to be the obser-
vation that a growing volume of scientific activities especially in the field of genetics 
and biochemistry is no longer curiosity-driven but carried out in the laboratories of 
private corporations; as a result, knowledge increasingly takes on the characteristics 
of a commodity. The economization of science is criticized (e.g. Balzer, 2003), for 
example, in the case of efforts to patent genes (see Matthijs, 2004; Resnik, 2004). 
Lyotard does not, however, offer any hint of the effect of the commodification of 
knowledge on the price of knowledge except perhaps in the most general sense that 
market forces will be responsible in setting prices.
Both of these approaches confirm the sensitivity of claims that knowledge comes 
with a price tag. Knowledge is simply a much too “valuable”, “special” and uniquely 
human or “largely unobservable”12 resource for it to be measured in any strictly 
monetary sense. Is the aim therefore to price knowledge an effort to “price the price-
less”? After all, knowledge in many ways resembles wisdom, insight, good judgment 
or “nature” (Fourcade, 2011) that are not at home in the market place13. Hence the 
often-repeated assertion that what cannot be counted or quantified is not necessar-
ily without value. We will return to this observation in our discussion of patents.
Still, according to some of the most influential international organizations, the 
World Bank (e.g. 2011) and the United Nations (e.g. unu-ihdp e Unep, 2014), it 
is “human capital” that is the most significant component of human wealth for most 
countries in the modern world. Economic growth requires capable workers. In other 
words, there is widespread agreement among social scientists that knowledge is the 
core determinant of economic growth in modern societies. For example, Claudia 
Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) show how human capital has been the defining 
12. Dominique Forey (2006, p. 9), for example, emphasizes that “knowledge is largely unobservable” and 
“most phenomena relating to knowledge are largely unmeasurable”.
13. “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in informa-
tion?” T.S. Eliot, Choruses from “The Rock”, 1934, i.
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factor for the economic identity of the industrialized world of the 20th century (also 
Acemoglu e Autor, 2012)14. However, there also is widespread disagreement about 
the exact terms of analysis. The expressions “human capital”, “skills”, “information”, 
“capacities” and “knowledge” that can be applied to all occupations, jobs, tasks and 
sectors of the economy are widely conflated in many of the studies. It is in general 
often also unclear how exactly human capital attributes are related to job performance 
and hence to rewards that might accrue to different values that the human capital 
of individuals constitutes.
Since human capital is seen to be virtually identical with the knowledge acquired 
and commanded by individuals, it would appear to be self-evident that the value 
offered in terms of human capital should constitute a road to an assessment of the 
value of knowledge. However, this is not the case, as we will show in the next section.
Human capital
Among the theoretical approaches and concepts that might be regarded as a proxy 
for the price of knowledge, cultural capital and human capital theories stand out. For 
example, efforts are made by economists to estimate the value of the “most valuable 
asset most people own [which] is their human capital” (Haggett e Kaplan, 2015, p. 
1); by the same token, corporations are quick to endorse the slogan “our employees 
are our best and most important asset”. For corporations and the economy informa-
tion about the value of human capital becomes a resource for financial reporting, 
fiscal management and managerial and political decision-making.
The struggle among the relative weights of those shares of collective income that 
are generated in the economy by different forms of capital has significant repercus-
sions for the formation of inequality in a society. Thomas Piketty ([2013] 2014, 
p. 21) for example notes, “the progress of technological rationality is supposed to 
lead automatically to the triumph of human capital over financial capital and real 
estate, capable managers over fat stockholders, and skill over nepotism”. But, as 
he adds a cautionary remark, “inequalities would thus become more meritocratic 
and less static (though not necessarily smaller): economic rationality would then 
14. Daron Acemoglu and David Autor (2012, p. 427) summarize the historical and econometric evidence 
of Goldin and Katz’s (2008) study: “Human capital is a central determinant of economic growth, both 
in general and in the specific case of economic growth in the United States during the twentieth cen-
tury”. In addition, the study demonstrates according to their reviewers that the steady accumulation 
of human capital is a major equalizing force in the labor market of the United States. It follows that 
rising inequality is a function of a slowing rate of accumulation of human capital in light of a growing 
demand for skilled-based occupations (Acemoglu e Autor, 2012, p. 456).
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in some sense automatically give rise to democratic rationality” (Piketty, [2013] 
2014, p. 21). 
In the course of the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, the linkage and 
the dependence of economic capital on cultural capital – and as we would specify, 
knowledge capacities – is significantly enhanced. Strata and individuals who are 
good at mobilizing knowledge capacities, for example, exploiting discretionary op-
portunities or the ability to generate new and persuasive ideas, are more likely to 
accumulate and defend financial gains within the frame of the knowledge economy 
(see Stehr, 2016, pp. 101-108). 
The notion of human capital has been developed and deployed primarily within 
economic discourse (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964; Tan, 2014) and, more specifically, 
the economics of education15. A variant of human capital theory, or its development 
in terms of incorporating empirical indicators of skills (for example, cognitive skills 
such as math, science, and literacy skills across countries), is what Eric Hanushek 
and Ludger Woessman (2015, p. 16) call knowledge capital theory. In any case, in 
human capital theory education plays a crucial role. 
As Gary S. Becker (1994b, p. 16) in a subsequent revisit of human capital theory 
therefore summarizes, “expenditures on education, training, medical care, etc., are 
investments in capital. However, these produce human, not physical or financial, 
capital because you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health, 
or values the way it is possible to move financial and physical assets while the owner 
stays put”. My human capital, in more extensive sense, as Michel Feher ([2007] 2009, 
p. 26) describes it succinctly “is me, as a set of skills and capabilities that is modified 
by all that affects me and all that I affect […] [Human capital] now refers to all that is 
produced by the skill ser that defines me. Such that everything that I earn – be it salary, 
returns on investment, booty, or favors I may have incurred – can be understood as 
the return on the human capital that constitutes me”. Thus, it is not only the formal 
education that counts as input to a person’s human capital but social influences too, 
such as that of the family.
15. An early critique of treating persons as human capital, thus constituting individuals not based on 
moral or ethical factors but on the logic of economic discourse, may be found in Shaffer (1961). Harry 
Shaffer objects that the term “investment” is not really applicable to the issue of human capital; “in-
vestment” in individual employees should not be used as a basis for policy formation. A fundamental 
criticism of the human capital theory is therefore also prompted by the (implicit?) idea that a more 
comprehensive school education is associated with productivity gains and that a higher income of 
these groups is seen as a function of these productive gains (e. g., Gouldner, 1979, p. 108). Randall 
Collins (1971) refers, as Gouldner (1979, p. 108) emphasizes that “the main activity of schools […] is 
to teach status cultures, this socializing persons to gain admission to status groups and their privileges” 
(see also Stehr, 2000).
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It is within the context of human capital theory that the value of knowledge, 
skills and capabilities of active economic agents and their costs becomes a relevant 
consideration. Not all the returns to human capital investment are necessarily mon-
etary in nature; “a person’s appreciation of literature over much of is or her lifetime” 
may also be a return to investment (Schulz, 1962, p. 7). But as the typical usage of 
the human capital theory in economics indicates what counts above all is the income 
generated by one’s human capital assets. In the world of symbolic economy valued 
income includes income from or the appreciation of financial products. 
If however we extend the consideration of the price of labor both comparatively 
across different societies or regions within societies (Teal, 2011, p. S8), then the price 
of labor is much more determined by where the person lives rather than the volume 
of human capital (held constant across nations or regions) an individual commands; 
and when we enlarge the time frame historically, then when a person lived is much 
more significant for the price of labor than her human capital (held constant over 
time). History and geography matter. And as Francis Teal (Idem) therefore concludes, 
“The central fact about the price of labour is that its price is much more closely cor-
related with where the person lives than with what they know”.
Just as physical capital is created by changes in the means of production brought 
about by new instruments and artifacts that facilitate production, human capital 
rests on the transformation of individuals who impart skills and capacities16 that 
allow them to contribute to productive processes17. In contrast to other forms of 
capital, human capital is embodied in its owner. Human capital is related to a worker’s 
earning capacity in the labor market. In its most simplified variety, human capital 
theory – with its strong influence on neo-liberal economic theory – expects income 
differences to be a strict reflection of acquired skill differentials of occupations. You 
earn what you deserve, as David Ricardo had already argued. The evaluation of hu-
man capital proceeds by analogy with the valuation of fixed capital. 
The acquisition of skills is a form of durable investment rather than consumption. 
The acquisition of human capital is fostered by the desire of the individual agent 
16. An exceptional, deviant definition of human capital that extends to so-called innate abilities of indi-
vidual agents is rarely found in economic discourse; but see Laroche and Mérette (1999, p. 88) for 
such a conception.
17. Human capital theory resonates strongly with post-war mainstream sociological theories of social 
stratification, for example, Talcott Parsons’ ([1949] 1954, p. 327) theory of social stratification: “the 
status of the individual must be determined on grounds essentially peculiar to himself, notably his 
own personal qualities, technical competence, and his own decisions about his occupational career 
and with respect to which he is identified with any solidary group… […] It is nevertheless fundamental 
that status and role allocation and the processes of mobility from status to status are in terms of the 
individual as a unit and not of solidary groups, like kinship groups, castes village communities etc.”. 
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to maximize utilities, a future-oriented perspective, constant rational conduct and 
stable preferences. The choices of the individual are constrained by market forces, 
time, income, and available opportunities (Becker, 1993) and thus depend on the 
conduct or judgment of others. 
Skills can be acquired by attending school and job training. Learning and training 
of course also happens outside formal educational institutions, especially on the job 
(Becker, 1994b, p. 20). In research on human capital, the number of years of school-
ing and job training is typically taken as a proxy for differential skills (for an example 
with historical data, see de Pleijt, 2016). Existing estimates of the rate of return rely 
almost exclusively on school attainment as a substitute for various skills relevant to 
occupational achievement (typically focusing on early career workers) rather than on 
any direct measures of cognitive skills and capacities over the full occupational history 
of workers such as ongoing learning (see Hanushek, Schwerdt e Wiederhold, 2015). 
A cautionary note would therefore refer, as Peter Cappelli (2014, p. 31) stresses: 
“Using education as a proxy for the ‘skill’ that employers want should be interpreted 
with caution as well given that the extensive literature in job analysis shows that the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that are used in jobs have at best only a partial overlap 
with what is taught in typical college courses”.
These estimates indirectly indicate the price of knowledge in the form of skills that 
make the employee more productive. Louis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg 
(2015, p. 5) make the point that it is not merely an estimate of the value of educational 
achievement that allows for a calculation of the value of human capital: “Perhaps 
the best measure of the marketable knowledge and skills of an agent is his or her 
wage”. In the end, the close correlation between wages and education ensures that 
every analysis of human capital value arrives at the same conclusion independent 
of its point of departure. Educational attainment as such is of course not irrelevant 
to occupational success; and, as internationally comparative studies have indicated, 
both the quality and quantity of education contribute to country differences in 
income and economic growth (e.g. Schoellman, 2012). 
An initial reduction in consumption or abandonment of other investment op-
portunities by economically rationally acting and motivated actors should pay off at 
a later time in the form of higher levels of income. Indeed, it is one of the governing 
assumptions in economic discourse on human capital that differential earnings are 
in fact related to the individual (atomistic) capital at hand in an unambiguous fash-
ion and based on motives that are constant across time and space (for a competing, 
sociological perspective see Fevre, Rees e Gorard, 1999; Hilmer e Hilmer, 2012). 
It is on the basis of these assumptions that estimates of the price of skills (Mincer, 
1974) and the rate of returns on investments into human capital are calculated (e.g. 
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Blaug, [1965] 1968). What proportions of the returns to skills will be appropriated 
by the individual who has invested in these skills is indeed a contentious matter. The 
corporation expects benefits (e.g. Barney, 1991; Becker e Gerhart, 1996) and may 
even appropriate most of the returns to the skills of the individual worker.
As long as labor market competition is free especially from extraneous constraints, 
and competition therefore approaches perfect competition, human capital theory 
assumes that income differentials among individuals directly reflect differential 
investments in the acquisition of the relevant skills. Human capital theory, then, 
amounts to a theoretical perspective that explains equality rather than inequality. 
“Unearned income” can only be generated by competitive distortions (see Atkinson, 
1983, p. 104; Berger, 2004, pp. 367-368). From a macro-perspective an increasing 
supply of human capital to the economy will reduce – assuming a demand for human 
capital that is lower than the supply – the skill premium or the value commanded 
by human capital (Acemoglu e Autor, 2012, p. 427).
Human capital is not homogeneous; for example, it is possible to distinguish 
between general human capital that is mobile, and specific context-sensitive human 
capital that is not mobile across boundaries. It is often argued that change in the 
kinds of skills in demand on the labor market is the result of changes in technology. 
Only the individual who made the investment in the first place can, under most 
circumstances, appropriate returns on human capital. Human capital is embodied 
capital. It cannot be separated from the individual, but the value of the investment 
depends also on the assessments made by other agents (see van Doorn, 2014) or on 
the network of social relations this individual is able to mobilize. The stock of human 
capital cannot be directly traded and transferred unless one trades and transfers the 
individual person. Human capital theory is silent on the influence of collective factors 
such as, for example, the societal reputation of educational degrees that affect the 
successful acquisition of human capital or, correspondingly, the failure to do so. It is 
equally opaque on the question of the depreciation of human capital and therefore 
on how the earning streams may decline or, for that matter, continue to grow over 
time18. Unlike the impact on capital invested in the plants and the equipment of a 
corporation, the impact of recessionary economic times, for example, on the value 
18. Based on considerations of this kind, Michel Feher ([2007] 2009, p. 27) argues that “an investor 
in his or her human capital is concerned less with maximizing the returns on his or her invest-
ments – whether monetary or psychic – than with appreciating, that is, increasing the stock value 
of, the capital to which he or she is identified. In other words, insofar as our condition is that of 
human capital in a neoliberal environment, our main purpose is not so much to profit from our 
accumulated potential as to constantly value or appreciate ourselves – or at least prevent our own 
depreciation”.
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of human capital (does it depreciate or even increase in value?) is an unexplored 
question (see Stiglitz, 2015, pp. 6-10)19.
By the same token, human capital theory tends to be quiet on the impact of 
socio-structural features of society and the nature of the economic system that may 
enhance or reduce payoffs in return for the investments made by the individual. 
Finally, human capital theory is silent “on what factors determine the skills that are 
demanded […]. [E]mpirical analysis of the return to education is not directly infor-
mative about what skills workers use on the job, why these skills are required, and 
how these skill requirements have changed over time” (Autor e Handel, 2009, p. 1).
Human capital theories as well as efforts to apply them empirically remain ham-
stringed by the superficial stylized notion of how human capital manifests itself in 
social reality. Mark Granovetters (1985, p. 486; also Williamson, 1975, pp. 255-
258) general criticism of those economists who recognize the importance of social 
relationships also applies to the typical exposition of theory and empirical study of 
human capital: “The interpersonal ties described in their arguments are extremely 
stylized, average, ‘typical’ – devoid of specific content, history, or structural location”.
The empirical representation of human capital is for the most part seen, as we 
have pointed out, to reflect the number of years of schooling; schooling being taken 
to represent a homogeneous variable and a valid indication of the differential skills 
and knowledge of the individual. Dajun Lin and his co-authors follow the conven-
tion of quantifying human capital by relating “cognitive performance” as measured 
by the end of secondary schooling in relation to labor market outcomes of twenty 
through fifty years old individuals. The labor market outcomes taken into consid-
eration in relation to cognitive performance are annual labor incomes and work 
hours and hourly wage rates as well as a measure of total (discounted) lifetime labor 
income. The cognitive performance was measured from scores of the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (afqt): “afqt scores are calculated using information from 
four of the ten Armed Services Vocation Aptitude Battery (Asvab) of tests – word 
knowledge, paragraph comprehension, math knowledge and arithmetic reasoning” 
19. See also the discussion of the creative class typology of occuations by Gabe, Florida and Mellen-
der (2013, p. 39) who assert that “in contrast to the educational-based human capital measure, the 
Creative Class occupational typology takes into account what people actually do (and related skill 
requirements) in their current jobs, rather than the amount of schooling they have completed”. The 
empirical evidence the authors (Gabe, Florida e Mellender, 2013, p. 51) consulted for the us la-
bor market between 2006-2011 indicates that “that having a Creative Class occupation lowers an 
individual’s probability of being unemployed – in fact, the effect is larger than the marginal effect 
associated with having a four-year college degree (compared to someone with only a high school 
diploma) – and that the impact of having a creative occupation became more beneficial in the two 
years following the recession”.
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(Lin, Lutter e Ruhm, 2016, p. 14)20. The analysis shows that “cognitive performance 
is positively associated with future labor market outcomes at all ages” (Idem, 2016, 
pp. 4, 24); moreover the “cognitive skill effect on income is universally larger for 
women than men, although the differences are not always statistically significant, 
with particularly pronounced gaps at young ages”. The effect of early life human 
capital investment of cognitive performance (exempting non-cognitive abilities 
in reaching adult outcomes) increases with age. The relationship continues to be 
observable after controlling for non-cognitive characteristics. The reported relations 
between an early-life cognitive achievement test and income could be the outcome 
of a number of varied intervening factors and social processes including for example 
the social status of the family of the individual subjects. 
The Becker-Tomes (1986) model of the intergenerational transmission of human 
capital recognizes the impact of previous generations on the individual’s acquisition 
of human capital. Specifically, the Becker-Tomes model proposes that the level of 
human capital and the abilities of parents matter for the human capital of their 
children when credit constraints limit the parents’ ability to invest in the human 
capital formation of their offspring. Whether or not the rational understanding 
of economic constraints or opportunities by parents, let alone their educational 
attainment, plays a role in the intergenerational transmission of human capital is 
a contested issue. A similar open question is the influence of grandparents on the 
transmission of human capital (see Lindahl, Palme, Sandgren-Massih e Sjögren, 
2014). In the final analysis, however, human capital theory tends to treat the complex 
dimension of cognitive capacities and skills and the intergenerational transmission 
of these abilities as a black box. 
Eric Hanushek and his colleagues (2015) have tried to partly fill this gap by 
providing information about the returns to cognitive skills across the entire labor 
force, using data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (Piaac) for 23 countries. How do earnings (expressed in pre-tax and 
pre-transfer wages) of full time workers between 35 and 54 years of age differ depend-
ing on a direct measure of cognitive skills?21 The results obtained in this analysis of 
20. The dollar amounts reported for the impact of cognitive performance of life time income are as fol-
lows: “A 0.1 standard deviation increase in afqt is associated with a rise of 2.15 percent, or $11,846, 
in lifetime income through 65 for the average nlsy79 respondent, which translates into an increase 
of $19,545 for an infant born in 2014. The predicted effect is somewhat larger in absolute terms for 
men than women ($20,724 versus $16,778 for 2014 births) but since women earn less than men, the 
percentage growth is substantially larger for females (2.62 percent versus 1.71 percent)”.
21. Piaac attempted to measure the cognitive and workplace skills that are needed to advance both on 
the job and in society. In 23 countries, a representative sample of adults was interviewed. Information 
about three fields of cognitive skills was collected: literacy, numeracy and problem solving in a high-
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the Piaac data focus on numeracy skills, that is, the “ability to access, use, interpret, 
and communicate mathematical information and ideas in order to engage in and 
manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations in adult life”, which the 
authors of the study considered comparable across countries. 
The results “consistently indicate that better skills are significantly related to 
higher labor-market earnings, […] a one-standard-deviation increase in numeracy 
skills is associated with an average increase in hourly wages of 17.8 percent across 
the 23 countries” (Hanushek, Schwerdt e Wiederhold, 2015, p. 108). The returns 
to skills, measured across numeracy, literacy and problem-solving domains, however, 
vary significantly from country to country. Returns to skills are twice as high in the 
United States as in the Scandinavian countries. 
Symbolic and knowledge capital
In contrast and in addition, the theory of cultural, symbolic and social capital 
mainly explicated by Pierre Bourdieu within sociological discourse, and the idea of 
knowledge capital proposed by André Gorz ([2003] 2010, pp. 1-2) begin to open 
up the black box of symbolic capital and alert us to the existence of immaterial forms 
of capital and the complex ways of its context-sensitive acquisition. Pierre Bourdieu 
([1983] 1986, p. 241; see also Michels, [1908] 1987, pp. 140-141) explicates his 
insights into the role of immaterial capital that can be translated into economic capi-
tal (that is “immediately and directly convertible into money”) with the economic 
perspective, particularly a Marxist approach, very much in mind. 
Bourdieu ([1983] 1986, p. 243) first encountered the usefulness of the notion 
“cultural capital” in social inequality research. This origin of Bourdieu’s theory 
of the reproduction of privilege has a considerable impact on the ways in which 
the notion of cultural capital designed to enlarge the orthodox concept of class is 
strategically deployed in discourse. Bourdieu’s research was designed to explain the 
unequal academic achievement of children from different social classes in France; 
unequal academic achievement, or the “specific profits” (failures) students are able 
acquire in the academic market, are related to the existing stratified distribution 
of cultural capital among social classes and the unequal chances of acquiring such 
capital at home (Bourdieu e Passeron, [1964] 1979). Cultural capital is added to 
existing cultural capital stocks, thereby reproducing the structure of the distribu-
technology environment. Literacy, for example, was defined as the “ability to understand, evaluate, 
use and engage with written texts to participate in society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s 
knowledge and potential” (Hanushek, Schwerdt, e Wiederhold, 2015, p. 108). 
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tion of cultural capital between social classes (Bourdieu, [1971] 1973, p. 73). It can 
therefore be argued that the benefits that derive from the unequal distribution of 
cultural capital represent a form of unearned income. Given its intellectual origins, 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital is fundamentally about societal power and 
domination. As a result, Bourdieu’s main concern is with the role this capital plays 
in the reproduction of social hierarchies. 
Although the educational system is of course not the only social site where cul-
tural capital may be acquired, education not only fulfills a role in converting academic 
into social hierarchies but has a function also in the legitimation and perpetuation 
of the social status quo. The pretensions of “merit”, “gifts”, skills, equal opportuni-
ties and democratic selection that appear to put the chances of acquiring cultural 
capital in the educational systems onto an equal footing are weakened by virtue of 
the fact that “the ruling classes have at their disposal (to begin with) a much larger 
cultural capital than the other classes” (Bourdieu, [1971] 1973, p. 85). The modern 
educational system canonizes privilege by ignoring it.
Bourdieu distinguishes between different forms of cultural capital: its embodied 
or symbolic form as internalized culture, its objectified form in material objects 
and media, and its institutionalized form (for example, as academic certificates)22. 
These distinctions signal the ways in which cultural capital is stored and passed on 
by way of becoming an integral habitus of the individual. Bourdieu identifies two 
additional forms of capital, economic capital and social capital. Social capital refers 
to the gains individuals may derive from their network of social relations (also Cole-
man, 1988)23. The various forms of capital correlate highly with each other and form 
22. It might be pointed out that Bourdieu’s discussion of cultural capital resonates strongly with Georg 
Simmel’s observations ([1907] 1978, pp. 439-440) in The philosophy of money about the role of the 
“intellect” in modern society. Simmel notes “the apparent equality with which educational materials 
are available to everyone interested in them is, in reality, a sheer mockery. The same is true for other 
freedoms accorded by liberal doctrines which, though they certainly do not hamper the individual from 
gaining goods of any kind, do however disregard the fact that only those already privileged in some way 
or another have the possibility of acquiring them. For just as the substance of education – in spite of, or 
because of its general availability – can ultimately be acquired only through individual activity, so it gives 
rise to the most intangible and thus the most unassailable aristocracy, to a distinction between high and 
low which can be abolished neither (as can socio-economic differences) by a decree or a revolution, nor 
by the good will of those concerned […]. There is no advantage that appears to those in inferior positions 
to be so despised, and before which they feel so deprived and helpless, as the advantage of education”.
23. For James Coleman (1988, pp. 100-101) social capital “comes about through changes in the rela-
tions among persons that facilitate action […]. Just as physical capital and human capital facilitate 
productive activity, social capital does as well. For example, a group within which there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group with-
out that trustworthiness and trust”. Coleman’s definition of social capital indicates that is impossible 
to quantify the value of individual social capital.
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what could be called capital “repertoires”. One form of capital “comes to be added, 
in most cases” to other forms of capital, for example, cultural to economic capital 
(Bourdieu, [1971] 1973, p. 99).
We will focus on Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital (or informational capital) 
since it resonates, at least on the surface, more closely with our concept of knowl-
edge, that is, knowledge as a capacity to act24. In Bourdieu’s understanding, cultural 
capital as a form of symbolic capital is much broader but also less tangible than the 
concept of human capital favored by economic discourse25. In contrast, the idea of 
knowledge capital as developed by André Gorz26 is a form of knowledge that is not 
acquired in settings of formal education but in everyday life and belongs to everyday 
culture. As a matter of fact, the notion of knowledge capital resonates closely with 
the concepts of knowledge skills that we have explicated elsewhere (Stehr, 2016).
As we have seen, modern economic human capital theory relates deliberate and 
measurable educational investments (and achievements) in the acquisition of useful 
skills and knowledge to the monetary gains or losses they generate, and therefore 
to the value of knowledge. As one of the originators of the idea of human capital, 
Theodore W. Schultz (1961), contends that skills and knowledge have grown in 
Western societies at a much faster rate than nonhuman capital. Schultz suggests that 
investment in human capital embodied in human beings has driven much of the 
growth in the real wages of income-earning individuals in recent decades, as well as 
economic growth in general (Benhabib e Spiegel, 1994)27.
24. See Adolf and Stehr (2014) and Stehr and Adolf (2015) for an extensive discussion of the concept of 
knowledge as a “capacity to act”.
25. More specifically, symbolic capital represents a social process and accomplishment; symbolic capital 
refers to intellectual or cognitive capacities; symbolic capital “is made […] by those who are submitted 
to it but if, and only if, the objective structure of its distribution is at the basis of the cognitive struc-
tures that they bring into play in order to produce it – as, for example, with such structuring opposi-
tions as masculine/feminine, young/old, noble/common, rich/poor, white/black. etc.”. (Bourdieu, 
1999, p. 336). 
26. André Gorz’s ([2003] 2004, p. 9) notion of knowledge capital or, rather, the knowledge that counts 
in the modern knowledge economy can be found in his introduction to the German edition of his 
book on The immaterial: knowledge, value and capital ([2003] 2010). However, Gorz’s idea is closely 
linked to economics: what is required in all branches of the economy is knowledge and, due to the 
growing “informatization”, knowledge not in the forms that are acquired in formal education but, 
rather, “non-formalized forms of knowledge […]. What is required is empirical knowledge, judgment, 
coordination, self-organization and communication ability, i.e. forms of living knowledge that can 
be acquired in everyday social dealings and is part of popular culture”. It is only on the basis of his 
specification of the relevant knowledge forms that a proximity to the concept of knowledge capability 
becomes visible.
27. Mara Squicciarini and Nico Vogtlaender (2014) demonstrate that human capital (in the sense of 
worker skills) is a strong predictor for economic development not only today but was so already at the 
beginning of the industrial revolution (also Mokyr, 2005).
Nico Stehr e Marian Adolf
196 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 1
In strong contrast, cultural capital theory does not proceed from the assumption 
of a kind of tabula rasa that allows all individuals to enter and participate in the 
competitive market where human capital is allocated and where success or failure 
is most affected by unequal natural aptitudes. Cultural capital theory not only 
acknowledges the preexisting unequal access to the distributional channels for its 
accumulation but also the different ways in which the “market” promotes the chances 
of particular players from the very beginning. In a largely undifferentiated society 
or community, of course, culture does not function as a vehicle for the emergence 
of differential cultural capital. As the societal division of labor increases, however, 
the social conditions of the transmission of cultural capital tend to be much more 
disguised than those that govern the transmission of economic capital. The portion 
of individual lives that can be afforded for the acquisition of cultural capital is highly 
significant. Cultural capital yields benefits of distinction for its owner. 
Even though the analysis of the acquisition and transmission of cultural capital is 
situated within what Bourdieu calls “social fields” (see Wacquant, 1989, p. 39), one 
of the most evident drawbacks of Bourdieu’s explication of cultural capital theory is, 
first, its strong individualistic bias, that is, the extent to which he stresses the fusion 
of cultural capital with the personality of its individual owner. Cultural capital is 
not a homogeneous phenomenon. Not all cultural capital is equal. Cultural capital 
is fragile. Fashion and the demand for novelty change the value of specific forms of 
cultural capital.
With Bourdieu, the emphasis remains for the most part on cultural capital as 
an inherent attribute of the individual carrier. Cultural capital in the form of edu-
cational credentials, for example, declines and dies with its carrier since it has the 
same biological limits as its carrier. Bourdieu’s individualistic conception of cultural 
capital appears to be linked to his determination not to dispossess cultural capital 
theory of the ability to calculate and attribute investment gains that derive from 
cultural capital. And such returns of investment are seen to accrue primarily to the 
investor. In this sense, cultural capital theory continues to resonate with human 
capital theory. It contains crucial residues of the economic discourse28. Frequent 
references to the marketplace, to supply and demand, to costs, investments and profits 
would be examples of such a conflation of perspectives. It is important to recognize 
28. In Bourdieu’s defense one has to recognize that however strongly the quantity of capital acquired may 
depend on, for example, the stock of capital already accumulated in the family of an individual, its 
actual acquisition is – as Simmel ([1907] 1989, p. 439) already observed – ultimately an individual 
activity. Moreover, Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1989, pp. 41-42) defends himself against the charge of a 
narrow “economism”; his choice of the term “capital”, for example, does not mean that he also adopts 
the narrow, economic conception of interests manifest in a single universal interest.
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that cultural capital is embodied in collective processes and structures; hence the 
benefits typically do not accrue only to those who have invested resources, which 
raises the free-rider issue. The production as well as consumption of such capital is 
not charged to the individual. It is borne by the collectivity. At one extreme, such 
capital can even be seen to be entirely free in that its use by certain individuals does 
not diminish its utility for or availability to others. Cultural capital is human-made 
capital and as such subject to limits and dynamics applicable to all human products 
and creations, especially in modern societies. 
Second, and as we have emphasized already, Bourdieu discovers and utilizes 
the concept of cultural capital in the context of social inequality research. The 
concept derives much of its coherence and its critical tone from this context, a 
context in which the persistence of distinction, of processes of inclusion and exclu-
sion, domination and subordination play a decisive role. Bourdieu thereby retains 
a strong reference to the objective and inescapable presence and constraint of the 
social, economic and political presence of social class in modern society29. Cultural 
capital, in the end, is merely derivative and closely mirrors the objective realities of 
class. As John R. Hall (1992, p. 257) therefore observes, “the dazzling variety and 
endless differences of culture obtain surprising coherence when we look at them 
through the lens of social stratification”. 
Cultural capital becomes a peculiar entity that is apparently acquired and trans-
mitted (reproduced) almost mechanically though in a selective fashion with great ease, 
considerable precision and success. The risks of failure appear to be at a minimum 
while the possibility of a perpetuation of the cultural and socio-structural patterns 
is at a maximum. Whether such a description conforms to reality is questionable, 
as is the idea that there is a close correspondence between particular manifestations 
of culture and class membership (see Halle, 1992, pp. 134-135). Culture is much 
more fluid and leaves “much opportunity for choice and variation” (DiMaggio, 
1997, p. 265). 
Access, at least today, is much more open than a theory of cultural capital that 
stresses the stratification of power and domination in society would suggest. Pierre 
Bourdieu’s distinction and the openness for change, resistance and innovation ac-
corded to the capacities of individuals and groups are limited (Garnham e Williams, 
1986, p. 129). But cultural frames and meaning production as well as re-production 
29. Sympathetic critics of Bourdieu’s capital theory have pointed to other attributes of his approach as 
problematic; for example, reference is made to the holistic presupposition as a general theoretical as-
sumption. Bourdieu tends to postulate cultural capital as a generalized medium of accumulation and 
distinction that is not suited for the analysis of a society with multiple cleavages and divisions (see 
Lamont e Lareau, 1988; Halle, 1992). 
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in an immense and creative variety of ways is the hallmark of the work that cultural 
capital conceived of in a less mechanical fashion may well accomplish for individu-
als and collectivities. It must also be asked if the relevance of class divisions is not 
undermined or even eliminated by virtue of the transformation of economic realities. 
In such a society, distinctions and advantages that are linked to cultural processes 
are not merely derivative and subordinate but foundational (Stehr, 2002). The ex-
tent to which the educational system in modern societies actually fails to faithfully 
reproduce the existing system of social inequality (Boudon, 1974) is testimony not 
only to the dynamic character of modern society but also to profound changes in 
inequality regimes in which knowledge and knowledge skills play a more significant 
and independent role (see Stehr, 1999; Stehr, 2015).
Third, although the notion of human cultural capital is not employed in a 
fully ahistoric manner, it is for the most part devoid of historical specificity, lacks 
linkage to various major societal formations such as industrial society, the state or 
science and is at times also used not unlike the notion of years of education in hu-
man capital theory (e.g. Bourdieu, [1984] 1988, pp. 230-232). Bourdieu does not 
explore the socio-historical conditions under which different strategies and regimes 
of inequality formation become possible. In principle it would seem that the idea 
of different forms of capital was universally applicable although the extent and the 
ease of their convertibility – for example the extent to which parental labor at home 
can be translated into status attainment for their children – varies within historical 
contexts (see Calhoun, 1995, pp. 139-141). 
New “structures of consciousness” (to use a term coined by Benjamin Nelson, 
1973) cannot be captured by Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital. In many ways, the 
structure of consciousness of knowledge societies is, of course, not novel. It resonates 
with the consciousness of modernity that dates – although this, too, is a highly 
contested issue – at least from the more immediate socio-historical origins of the 
French Revolution. In other respects, the conscience collective in knowledge societies 
is at variance with the belief systems and mental sets that are usually identified as 
uniquely modern and therefore warrants to be called a new structure of conscious-
ness. In any event, the notion of cultural capital seems ill-designed to capture such 
transformations. Given its close reliance on the assertion that cultural capital is 
about power and domination, it cannot capture the opposite phenomenon, namely 
the extent to which knowledge is strategically deployed to soften and undermine 
authority, power and domination. 
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Patents30
Patents represent a legal grant (a category in law) by (typically) a state or bundle of 
states such as the European Patent Office (epo) or a series of corresponding patents 
(Triadic Family of patents at the epo, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(Uspto and the Japan Patent Office). A simple definition of a patent would be that 
the inventor is granted property rights for a specified time (seventeen years in the 
United States) and space in analogy to the general legal rules governing property in 
general. The owner of the invention acquires a legal title that prevents others from 
making, using, or selling the invention while granting the owner the right to sell her 
“intangible” asset for a price. A patent – often acquired in a lengthy administrative 
process involving highly specialized experts – grants the owner the right to practice 
the invention described in the patent. Thus, patents convert knowledge into private 
property31 and knowledge becomes scarce in a legal sense. It is the owner of the 
patent who has to insure that the patent is not misused. Under the conditions of 
globalization such a control can be most difficult. A patent may come with strict 
or weaker restrictions of its use by other actors. The policy challenge is to find the 
right mix (Forey, 2000, pp. 76-77).
Since the 1980s, policies with regard to the legal protection of intellectual prop-
erty (patents, trademarks, copyrights) have changed radically, and litigation about 
patent infringements has risen (for example, the patent struggle between Apple and 
Samsung about the design of the smart phone)32. With the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (wto) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (Trips), 
stringent und unprecedented obligations have been enacted for all members of the 
wto with respect to their national intellectual property policies. In order to take 
part in international trade and access foreign markets, every member country has 
30. An informative discussion and description of intellectual property concepts and procedures including 
a brief reference to patent law systems may be found in Knight (2013, pp. 1-48). A history of the idea 
of intellectual property rights may be found in Long (1991) and Hesse (2002).
31. On the sociological definition of private property rights and its implicit utilization ban, see Heinrich 
Popitz, (1986, pp. 111-112). For a discussion of the various advantages identified in the literature on 
patents see Budish, Roin and Williams (2016). Of course patents also involve costs. “The average U.S. 
patent costs an estimated $20,000 to obtain and thousands more to keep from expiring before its term, 
which is 20 years from the application date” (Farre-Mensa, Hegde e Ljungqvist, 2017).
32. As the Guardian (February 12, 2013) reported, “the agricultural giant Monsanto has sued hundreds 
of small farmers in the United States in recent years in attempts to protect its patent rights on geneti-
cally engineered seeds that it produces and sells”; a report by the Center for Food Safety and the Save 
Our Seeds campaigning groups “has outlined what it says is a concerted effort by the multinational to 
dominate the seeds industry in the us and prevent farmers from replanting crops they have produced 
from Monsanto seeds”.
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to adopt legal frames that conform to patent laws in the economically dominant 
countries of the world. Moreover, the transnational integration of the major pat-
ent offices in the United States, Europe and Japan has created a global network of 
knowledge governance that results in a “concealed” harmonization of patent laws 
(Drahos, 2010)33. 
But patent protection is not just a technical or economic matter. Patent laws 
have social, political as well as economic implications. Intellectual Property Rights 
(ipr) are intended to offer incentives to stimulate innovation (Stiglitz e Greenwald, 
2014, pp. 429-456)34. The counterpart to intellectual property rights is the public 
domain. William Landes and Richard Posner (2003, pp. 14-15) note that even the 
strongest defenders of property rights “acknowledge the economic value of preserv-
ing public domains – that is, of areas in which property is available for common use 
rather than owned – even in regard to physical property and a fortiori in regard to 
intellectual property”.
A debate surrounding intellectual property rights that is just starting (Li, 
MacGarvie e Moser, 2015) but is getting more intense concerns the extent to 
which scientific texts, for example, are made freely available by companies (such as 
Google, Academia or Research Gate) or libraries, to the dismay of publishers and 
authors35. Opponents to free access see these developments as a one-sided privilege 
favoring the “consumers” of texts and neglecting the rights of the “producers” of 
the respective intellectual accomplishments. Supported by law and court decisions, 
33. The resistance by ngos to Trips-inspired legislation is chronicled in Matthews (2011).
34. Economic or innovation-centered perspectives have indeed dominated the discussion about patents. 
More recently, a broader view relies on a “rights-based” perspective. As Stephen Hilgartner (2002, p. 
945) argues, “decisions about intellectual property are about much more than simply finding ways to 
stimulate and reward innovation; they are also about accountability, control, and governance” leading 
to a politics of patents conception.
35. Consider the following recent example: “During the past few years, as the cost of tv rights for sport-
ing events has escalated apparently without limit, so has the ease by which conventional broadcast 
methods can be circumvented. Despite the best efforts of global authorities, including the City of 
London Police’s Intellectual Property Crime Unit (Pipcu), the proliferation, accessibility 
and reliability of sport streaming sites have only increased. ‘Historically, most arrests and 
attempted prosecutions are made under the provision of the Copyright, Designs and Pat-
ents Act 1988, which prohibits the broadcast of material without the license of the copy-
right owner. However, in February 2012, during a case between the Premier League and a 
pub landlady from Portsmouth named Karen Murphy, the European Court ruled that live 
sporting events could not be regarded as ‘intellectual creations’. They were instead ‘subject 
to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom’. The court decided that ‘accord-
ingly, those events cannot be protected under copyright’”. See http://www.theguardian.
com/football/2015/aug/01/faster-easier-free-illegal-football-streams, accessed August 1, 
2015, and http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/feb/24/pub-landlady-karen-mur-
phy-premier-league, accessed August 1, 2015.
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libraries in Germany, for example, are permitted to scan textbooks and make them 
available for students to save on sticks – which of course allows them to pass them 
on without restrictions36.
Critical issues surrounding patents involve the question whether patents actu-
ally stimulate innovation (Williams, 2016 for an empirical investigation of he 
issue in the health care market), the extent to which patents add to the price the 
consumer has to pay (for example, for pharmaceuticals), the meaning of a fencing-
in of knowledge, in the first place, which we have discussed, or the scope and the 
degree of novelty demanded for granting a parent. Answers to these issues are highly 
contestable. Every invention that is granted legal protection for a limited period 
of time of course relies on previously accumulated knowledge (Stiglitz, 1999, pp. 
314-316; Stiglitz, 2012, p. 78). “Because patent lawyers are masters of obfusca-
tion”, as the Economist (“Time to fix patents”, August 8, 2015) argues, patents in 
fact tend to slow innovation by slowing the dissemination of knowledge; patents 
tend to lock in the advantages of the patent holders. Hence the conclusion that 
follows from critical questions about the role of patents would seem to be that the 
patent system should not be enhanced but reduced in its impact, if not abolished 
(see Boldrin e Levine, 2013)37. 
Private intellectual property rights (ipr) now widely employed by law-makers at 
international (Fink e Maskus, 2005), national and regional levels are not restricted 
to patents but also extend to copyrights (which, in contrast to patents, are acquired 
almost instantly upon creation), databases (David, 2000), trademarks, designs, 
software (see Harison, 2008; Bonaccorsi, Calvert e Joly, 2011), plant varieties, and 
trade secrets (in the sense of information and knowledge held by a business that is 
kept out of the public domain through agreements with employees or other firms)38. 
It is not surprising therefore to observe that there are many types of intellectual 
property rights and many types of institutions that deal with their administration. 
The variety of intellectual property rights and the ways they interrelate with law, 
36. See Roland Reiss, “Eine Kriegserklärung an das Buch” [A declaration of war on books], Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, October 13, 2015.
37. Michele Boldrin and David Levine (2013, p. 3) sum up their case against the economic efficacy of 
patents as follows: “There is no empirical evidence that [patents] serve to increase innovation and pro-
ductivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded – which, as evidence 
shows, has no correlation with measured productivity”. 
38. We have to recognize – although this attribute of the concept of intellectual property is not part of our 
analysis of the value of knowledge – that the notion of intellectual property is an essentially contested 
concept across different cultures, for example, in cultures that mainly rely on oral or written transmis-
sion (Garmon, 2002) or in societies that recognize hybrid ownership between strictly individual and 
strictly collective (public domain) ownership (e.g. Strathern, 2005; Ghosh e Soete, 2006; for the case 
of software, see Ghosh, 2005).
Nico Stehr e Marian Adolf
202 Tempo Social, revista de sociologia da USP, v. 30, n. 1
markets, corporations and individuals makes it most difficult if not impossible to 
gain a robust general insight into the value of (distinctive) ideas, inventions, knowl-
edge and copyrights39. The propensity to attempt to patent an invention or, on the 
contrary, to make ideas freely available depends on the social context in which new 
knowledge is discovered. For example, 
[…] using data collected by the National Research Council within the U.S. National Acad-
emies from their survey of firms that received National Institutes of Health Phase ii Small 
Business Innovation Research awards between 1992 and 2001, (Link e Ruhm, 2009) find 
that entrepreneurs with academic backgrounds are more likely to publish their intellectual 
capital compared to entrepreneurs with business backgrounds, who are more likely to patent 
their intellectual capital (Link e Ruhm, 2009, p. 1).
The benefits that accrue to intellectual property may arrive in many ways, depend-
ing on the nature of the invention (such as a license granted or the signal a patent 
sends to others, see Long, 2002). After all, Research and Development (r&d) efforts 
are inherently heterogeneous, sometimes successful, at other times without valuable 
results and “there is a large variance in the value of individual patents, rendering 
patents counts an extremely noise indicator of r&d success” (Czarnitzki, Hall e 
Oriani, 2006, p. 124). At best, we will be able to arrive at an indirect and ambivalent 
assessment, especially with respect to quantity, of the value and costs associated with 
intellectual proper rights40.
In the strict sense of the term, knowledge tends to be embedded only in patents 
and not in trademarks. Trademarks are names affixed by a company to their products 
or similar attributes; hence, based on our definition of information, trademarks 
convey information. From an economic perspective, a patent – if well enforced – 
39. For this reason, one may infer, the European Commission and the other international organizations 
in their report System of National Accounts 2008 (2009, p. 263) conclude, “originals of intellectual 
property products, such as computer software and entertainment, literary or artistic originals should 
be entered at the written down value of their initial cost, revalued to the prices of the current period. 
Since these products will have often been produced on own account, the initial cost may be estimated 
by the sum of costs incurred including a return to capital on the fixed assets used in production. If value 
cannot be established in this way, it may be appropriate to estimate the present value of future returns 
arising from the use of the original in production” (our emphasis). 
40. 157 U.S. universities responding to a 2011 survey of the Association of University Technology Man-
agers reported an earned income of “more than $1.8-billion from commercializing their academic 
research in the 2011 fiscal year, collecting royalties from new breeds of wheat, from a new drug for 
the treatment of hiv, and from longstanding arrangements over enduring products like Gatorade”. 
See G. Blumenstyk, “Universities Report $1.8-Billion in Earnings on Inventions in 2011”, Chronicle 
of Higher Education August 28, 2012.
The price of knowledge, pp. 179-232
203Abril   2018
represents a monopoly that offers a rent to the owner. In the context of examining 
the value of knowledge, we are interested in the rent patents may generate41.
As Margaret Blair and Steven Wallman (2001, p. 73) in their report on “unseen 
wealth” point out, “once an intangible [such as a copyright] has been defined by 
law as a piece of property, and the rights associated with that property have been 
delimited, it becomes easier to estimate a value associated with those property 
rights and to sell, or transfer, or enter into other transactions involving that piece 
of property”. Assigning property rights to an invention, a text, a musical score or 
software does, as such, not immediately allow for an assessment of the value of in-
tellectual property. In fact, the value of intellectual property could be zero or even 
negative if the investment afforded for generating the invention is never returned. 
Presumably, not all patents are successful. The value will be a function of the many 
additional features related to the activity of the owner, for example his willingness 
to invest in activities protecting the monopoly or, last but not least, of the nature of 
the intellectual property itself. 
From an economic perspective, a patent enshrined in law represents a capacity to 
act and a solution to the “appropriability problem” (a protective function for new 
knowledge) or is seen to offer an answer to the free-rider issue since knowledge is 
viewed as “non-excludable”. Patent protection translates non-rival goods into ex-
cludable goods. Only the patent holder is legitimized to appropriate the benefits of 
the invention. Others are excluded from enjoying the profits of the knowledge in 
question. In addition, from an economic point of view, patents are seen to serve as 
an incentive to produce socially and economically desirable innovations. 
Patent laws are powerfully influenced by assumptions about knowledge and in-
novation from neo-classical economics (see Dempsey, 1999). But a comprehensive 
theory of the economic effects of patents must also take into account that legal 
intellectual property protections can restrain rather than encourage innovation, 
the growth of knowledge and socio-economic development. If knowledge is de-
fined as a public good (Stiglitz, 1995;  Zhou, 2015), that is, as non-rival in use and 
non-excludable in consumption, the ideas associated with knowledge claims “may 
even stimulate others to have an idea with large commercial value” (Stiglitz, 1999, 
p. 309)42. On the other hand, profit-oriented actors would not be interested in 
41. Whether or not monopolies are a burden on value-adding activities or even encourage desirable in-
novations or lead to overpricing and undersupply, is not at issue in our examination of patents (but 
see Nordhaus, 1969; Boldrin e Levine, 2005; Crampes e Langinier, 2009).
42. As a matter of practical considerations, the strength, the design and the range of intellectual property rights 
has a strong influence on the “extent to which innovation adds or subtracts from the pool of ideas that are 
available to be commercially exploited, i.e. to technological opportunities” (Stiglitz, 2014, p. 1; 2010).
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entering into the production of public goods because they could not make a profit 
(Archibugi e Filippetti, 2015, p. 481). André Gorz (2003)43 defends the desirability 
of treating knowledge as a common good on the basis of a couple of considerations: 
(1) Knowledge is from the outset the product of collective labor, (2) knowledge 
does not have the attributes of commodities that escape the owner’s control upon 
being sold or losing legal control and (3) privatization would restrict the societal 
utility of knowledge. But as Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (2007, p. 5) warn, 
a common good leads to conduct “such as competition for use, free riding and over-
harvesting”; and “[t]ypical threats to knowledge commons are commodification or 
enclosure, pollution and degradation, and nonsustainability”. Even if you declare 
and understand that knowledge is a common good what remains is the difficult task 
and process to devise and learn effective ways with the help of which knowledge 
can be shared44. Such a demand is of course at the core of every educational effort.
In a “well-functioning” economy the monetary value of an individual good should 
be represented by its price. Many efforts have been made to accomplish exactly 
this. Most often efforts to establish the value of intellectual property are based on 
the use of proxies45. For example, the value of ipr are inferred from the value of the 
prices of shares of a company listed on the stock exchange, thus establishing ipr as 
part of the “unseen wealth” of a corporation. Intangibles “can be related to brand 
names, process or product innovations, advertising, managerial skill, human capital 
in the workforce, and other aspects of the firm” (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007, p. 
551; also Van Eckelen, 2015)46. Such arithmetic indicates that highly contentious 
figures could result from such an effort. It is virtually impossible to arrive at a robust 
conclusion regarding whether such an accounting under- or overestimates the value 
of the intellectual property of a firm. In short, “the eventual returns to individual 
patents or trademarks can vary enormously: most returns are very small, but a few 
generate huge returns”. 
43. Interview with André Gorz, “Entsinnlichung des Wissens” [The loss of meaning of knowledge]. Die 
Tageszeitung, August 8, 2003.
44. As Alfredo Macias Aazquez and Pablo Alonso Gonzalez (2016, pp. 46-47) note in general terms, “it 
would be crucial to organize cooperative and relational processes grounded in non-exclusionary and 
non-divisible principles, Likewise, it would be necessary to development mechanisms of ownership 
regulation that are not solely underpinned by anonymous criteria supported by legal provisions that 
have a single set of terms to all users”.
45. There are of course legal means for enforcing the rights inherent in a patent, trademark and copyright. 
The recognition of the considerable economic value and, perhaps, also economic power and prestige 
has led to an increase in litigation activities in the context of iprs (Hoti e McAleer, 2006).
46. Bregie van Eckelen (2015, p. 447) investigates “what conditions need to be met for knowledge to be 
incorporated as a new category of value, and whether these conditions (such as separability, commen-
surability and appropriability) differ from the accounting requirements for more tangible capital”.
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What is possible, however, is to revert to the broad collective income and the ex-
penditures of royalty and license fees received and paid by entire nations. The World 
Bank (2015)47 offers such statistics for a wide range of countries. And as recent data 
from the “2014 World Development Indicators” show, the “Balance of Technology 
Trade” is heavily tilted in favor of a few countries whose expenditures on Research 
and Development, as percentages of the national Gross National Product (gnp), 
have been high (also Ganguli, 2000). 
Large expenditures on research and development (r&d) in a country appear to 
ensure that the balance of royalty and license fees received is positive (e.g. in the case 
of Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
while comparatively low r&d expenditures correlate with a negative balance (e.g. in 
the case of Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Portugal and Russia). But there are cases where 
this correlation does not hold, for example in the case of Austria where high r&d 
expenditures coexist with a negative balance of royalty and license fees both in 2007 
and 2014. In many instances of nations with a significant balance of inter-nation 
technology trade, the gap has increased in recent years (e.g. Canada, Austria, India, 
Italy and Korea)48.
The statistic of the inter-nation technology trade balances does not allow for a 
precise inference of many relevant data regarding the value and costs of intellectual 
property rights. It provides only a very broad indication that such rights are translated 
into national monetary advantages; that both payments and receipts of royalty and 
license fees tend to increase in more recent years; that disadvantages and benefits 
are unequally distributed across the globe; and about the size of the receipts and 
payments. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the economic role of intellectual 
property rights is increasing measurably, signifying the transformation of national 
economies into what is at times designated as knowledge-based economies. 
47. See http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&Topic=14.
48. In the 2009 publication of the System of National Accounts, one finds the follow cautionary note, “the 
value of research and development (r&d) [which does not include the value of human capital] should 
be determined in terms of the economic benefits it is expected to provide in the future. This includes the 
provision of public services in the case of r&d acquired by government. In principle, r&d that does 
not provide an economic benefit to its owner does not constitute a fixed asset and should be treated 
as intermediate consumption. Unless the market value of the r&d is observed directly, it may, by 
convention, be valued at the sum of costs, including the cost of unsuccessful r&d” (European Com-
mission et al., 2009, p. 206; emphasis added).
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Taxation, or the price of education49
It is not only the professional but also the common-sense view that citizens of 
democratic societies should be knowledgeable and well informed. Being knowledge-
able and well informed comes at a price. One avenue that is open to social scientists 
interested in the question of the price of knowledge is to examine specific contested 
cases in which the question of the price of knowledge does play a role, if only an 
indirect one. We will describe such a conflict about the resources that should be 
mobilized by the state to ensure that its citizens acquire the level of knowledge and 
information that is deemed desirable for a democratic society50.
During the last century the relation between education and democracy had be-
come almost conventional wisdom. John Dewey ([1916] 2005), for example, views 
broad if not high levels of educational attainment as a precondition for democracy; 
while in the post-war era, Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959, p. 80) cross-national em-
pirical study comes to the conclusion that “high” levels of educational achievement 
are a necessary condition for the existence and stability of a democratic society. Even 
more recent empirical work tends to support this conclusion (e.g. Barro, 1999 e 
Przeworski et al., 2000). An examination of the role and experience of science ad-
vising and science policy formation in the United States in the late 1950s (last but 
not least in the wake of the launch of the first manmade satellite, Sputnik, by the 
Soviets in the fall of 1957) emphatically concludes that “a democratic nation can 
only cope with the scientific revolution if thoughtful citizens know what it truly 
entails” (Dupré e Lakoff, 1962, p. 181). 
However, it is also John Dewey ([1916] 2005, pp. 108-110) who warns against 
treating education as a black box. High levels of formal education are indeed com-
patible – as the case of Germany demonstrates – with an authoritarian personality 
and an elevated deference to the state. Dewey ([1916] 2005, p. 57) notes that in 
the case of the German educational system, “the educational process was taken to 
be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development […] only in and 
through an absorption of the aims and meaning of the organized institutions does 
[the individual] attain true personality”. In other words, the philosophy of educa-
tion and the aims of the educational system “required subordination of individuals 
to the superior interests of the state”. The subservient personality as the primary 
49. An initial discussion of the taxation-regime perspective on the price of knowledge can be found in 
Stehr, 2015.
50. The discussion in the scientific and legal literature of the “direct” taxation of knowledge or intangible 
resources is in its infancy (see Simkovic, 2015). The only discussion we could find of the practice of 
taxation, in the United States in this case, is a brief article by Luscombe (1996). 
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goal to be realized by educational policies not only in imperial Germany but for 
decades to come required a “thoroughgoing ‘disciplinary’ subordination to existing 
institutions”. Dewey’s observations are a useful reminder that a high formal level of 
education in a society does not necessarily lead to support for democratic values and 
conduct. The association between formal educational achievement and democracy 
is a complex relationship that requires careful attention to the nature of the actual 
education system.
This raises the question of how much knowledge and information the citizen 
of modern societies needs to acquire, and the related issue of the volume of the 
resources the state has to invest to accomplish such an outcome. There can be little 
doubt that these questions are highly complex and contentious, as the long-lasting 
conflict between the State of New York and the City of New York over educational 
finances readily demonstrates51.
For over a decade, the State of New York and the City of New York were entangled 
in a legal battle over the question of whether the State of New York provided fair 
and sufficient financial means for the gigantic public school system of the City of 
New York52. The legal dispute ran its course parallel to the so-called “educational 
standards movement” which has been fighting for the continual improvement of 
the expectations and standards attached to a high school diploma. In a number of 
American states, for example Kentucky, courts have indeed prescribed much higher, 
clearly defined standards. 
51. A comparable and equally drawn-out legal dispute between the State of New Jersey and plaintiffs 
who argued that the state provided inadequate funding to some school districts in order to ensure the 
“provision of educational services sufficient to enable pupils to master the Core Curriculum Content 
Standards” was settled by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on May 24, 2011 in favor of the plaintiffs. 
The court enjoined the State of New Jersey to increase state education aid by $500 million in the com-
ing school year, distributed among 31 school districts in historically poor cities. The Court concluded 
that the State failed to meet its constitutional burden to make sure that a “thorough and efficient 
education” was provided. The New Jersey constitution indeed charges the State with the fundamental 
responsibility to educate schoolchildren: “The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and sup-
port of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in 
the State between the ages of five and eighteen years” (N.J. Const. art. viii, § 4, 1.). The fundamental 
right to an adequate education extends to all children in the State. The court relied in its decision on 
Special Master’s Opinion/Recommendations to the Supreme Court, submitted by Judge Peter E. 
Doyne (source http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/index.htm and Winnie Hu and Richard 
Pérez-Peña, “Court orders New Jersey to increase aid to schools”. New York Times, May 25, 2011).
52. We rely on the accounts of the conflict between the State of New York and the City of New York 
found in the New York Times, especially the article dated June 30, 2002 (“Johnny can read, not well 
enough to vote?”); and subsequent coverage in the same newspaper, especially “School financing case 
argued before State’s highest court”. New York Times, October 11, 2006 (also Scherer, 2004-2005).
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At first glance, this is apparently one of those everyday rhetorical disputes be-
tween different political jurisdictions over contested questions of revenue sharing 
between various political levels – a familiar occurrence in any democratic society. 
The State of New York provides approximately half of the school budget for the 
City of New York. One of the most recent judgments in this legal action, however, 
has made reference to a fundamental philosophical or constitutional problem: 
Which skills, information and proficiencies should the modern state be minimally 
obligated to successfully convey to students in its schools; and how expensive must 
an education system be that guarantees standards of this type? The developments 
in the New York dispute make it evident that this conflict over how to answer the 
question under debate is ultimately based on a problem that must be decided within 
the political system. 
The constitution of the State of New York stipulates that the State is obligated 
to guarantee “the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools 
wherein all the children of this state may be educated”. The interpretation of this 
constitutional norm as an obligation for the state to make possible a “sound, basic” 
education is concretized by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, in a 
1995 judgment. This court further ruled that the public school system must be in 
a position to guarantee that students “function productively as civic participants 
capable of voting and serving on a jury”. In a later judgment of 2001, a judge of the 
Constitutional Court of the State of New York ruled that as jurors, citizens are 
required to answer complex questions: Jurors “must determine questions of fact 
concerning dna evidence, statistical analysis and convoluted financial fraud, to 
name only three topics”. The State successfully appealed this judgment.
In June 2002, however, the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court of 
New York defined a restrictive interpretation of this constitutional norm: On the 
basis of relevant constitutional standards, the State is not obliged to finance more 
than a minimal education. More concretely, after eight or nine years, students should 
be able to read political parties’ campaign literature; serve the courts as jurors; and 
fulfill the requirements of an employment that makes minor demands on them. The 
high school diploma should only ensure that the student had acquired the ability 
“to get a job, and support oneself, and thereby not be a charge on the public fiscus”.
The court’s decision was variously received: In some quarters, this minimal edu-
cational requirement was understood as a kind of capitulation on the part of the 
State. In others, the judges were praised for their wise decision, since (more) money 
was not necessarily an adequate solution to the educational dilemma – other fac-
tors also influenced students’ opportunities of acquiring cultural capital. The court 
emphasized that its task had been only to determine the citizen’s minimum rights 
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to education as laid out in the constitution; this minimum demand is indeed met 
by the schools of the City of New York. A claim for compensatory education, for 
instance, is therefore untenable. And to the extent that the citizens disagree with 
these minimum goals, they will have to replace the responsible politicians by electoral 
means. The plaintiff, The Campaign for Fiscal Equity, filed an appeal.
Could this ruling by one of the highest courts of the State of New York be an 
arbitral verdict that reflects the spirit of the industrial rather than the knowledge 
society, that is, what matters is that its citizens are able to find their way to the voting 
booth and function as a juror? 
The legal dispute finally ended (with no possibility of appeal) on November 20, 
2006 with a verdict by the highest court of the State of New York, the Court of 
Appeals, in which the State of New York was ordered to provide an additional 1.93 
billion dollars annually for the city school system. This sum is considerably less than 
the 4.7 billion dollars that a lower court had ruled to be appropriate. The final judg-
ment was based on the recommendation of a commission appointed by New York 
State Governor Pataki in 2004. In a dissenting opinion from that of the majority of 
the court, one of the two judges in the minority states that “a sound basic education 
will cost approximately $5 billion in additional annual expenditure. I remain hopeful 
that, despite the court’s ruling today, the policymakers will continue to strive to make 
schools not merely adequate, but excellent, and to implement a statewide solution”. 
The four judges responsible for the court’s majority verdict were all appointees of 
then New York Governor George Pataki (1995-2006).
Additional knowledge
Additional knowledge enlarges our capacity to act; thus novel or additional 
knowledge may be of particular value. It is unavoidable that knowledge has political 
as well as economic attributes. Knowledge as a capacity to act contributes to what is 
constitutive for politics: to change or to preserve and perpetuate. In general, there-
fore, knowledge is a medium of social control because once deployed it may structure 
and restructure social formations. In the context of the knowledge-based economy 
in modern societies (Stehr, 2002), knowledge becomes a force of production, dis-
placing the forces of production typical of industrial society, namely property and 
capital, and therefore a source of additional value, economic growth and productivity 
including, of course, the possibility of a transition to a sustainable economic system.
The science system in modern societies is by definition a core part of the set 
of societal institutions that generates additional knowledge. The prestige, the ex-
ceptional social, economic and intellectual importance of scientific knowledge is 
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firmly associated with the capacity of the social system of science within which it is 
embedded to fabricate additional knowledge claims. In modern societies, scientific 
and technical knowledge is uniquely important because it produces incremental 
capacities for social and economic action, or an increase in the ability of “how-to-
do-it” that may be “privately appropriated”, at least temporarily53. In social institu-
tions other than science, routinized, habitual conduct and the interpretation and 
defense of established intellectual perspectives are constitutive. In science, invention 
and therefore the production of knowledge beyond what already exists is the prime 
function of the social system of science.
Contrary to neoclassical assumptions, in the case of the economic importance 
of knowledge in general and additional knowledge in particular the unit price for 
knowledge-intensive commodities and services decreases with increased production, 
reflecting “progress down the learning curve” (Schwartz, 1992; see also the economic 
implications of learning by doing, Arrow, 1962b). Incremental knowledge is just as 
heterogeneous as is socially widely accessible knowledge. Thus it is entirely conceiv-
able that incremental knowledge may, at any given time, include “key findings” that 
will prove to be especially valuable in many respects, as for example in economic, 
military or political contexts. Which knowledge will become key knowledge can 
only be determined empirically (see Stehr, 2000). 
Knowledge constitutes a basis for power. Knowledge excludes. As John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1967, p. 67) stresses with justification, power “goes to the factor which 
is hardest to obtain or hardest to replace […] it adheres to the one that has greatest 
inelasticity of supply at the margin”. But knowledge as such is not a scarce commod-
ity, though there is one feature of some knowledge claims that may well transform 
knowledge from a plentiful into a scarce resource: what is scarce and difficult to 
obtain is not access to knowledge per se, but access to incremental knowledge, to a 
“marginal unit” of knowledge. The greater the tempo with which incremental knowl-
edge ages or decays, the greater the potential influence of the social system within 
which additional knowledge is produced and the greater the social importance and 
prestige of those who manufacture or augment knowledge; and, correspondingly, of 
those who transmit (moderate) such increments to other social systems. 
53. Peter Drucker (1993, p. 184) observes that the initial economic advantages gained by the application 
of (new) knowledge become permanent and irreversible. What this implies, according to Drucker, is 
that imperfect competition becomes a constitutive element of the economy. Knowledge can be dis-
seminated or sold without leaving the context from which it is disseminated or sold. The edge that 
remains is perhaps best described as an advantage based on cumulative learning. The matter is even 
more complicated by virtue of the possibility that the acquisition of incremental knowledge may 
mean that “the buyer does not know what she is buying, and not need the product when she knows” 
(Eggertsson, 2009, p. 138).
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If sold, knowledge enters the domain of others; yet it remains within the domain 
of the producer and can be spun off once again. This signals that the transfer and 
the absorption of knowledge do not necessarily include the transfer of the cogni-
tive ability to generate such knowledge, for example, the theoretical apparatus, the 
technological regime or the required infrastructure that yields such knowledge claims 
in the first place and is the basis for them to be calibrated and validated. Cognitive 
skills of this kind, therefore, are scarce. Economists often take it for granted that the 
fabrication of knowledge is expensive whereas its dissemination is virtually without 
cost. This view is further supported by the common conviction that technological 
knowledge is nothing but a blueprint that is readily usable, at nominal cost, for all. 
However, the acquisition of the kinds of cognitive skills needed to comprehend 
knowledge and technology can be quite expensive. For example, in many cases, only 
the rough outlines of technical knowledge are objectified or codified by non-personal 
means of communication (Berrill, 1964). As a result, some economists suggest that 
the dissipation and absorption of knowledge, or at least some forms of knowledge, is 
more costly than its production (see Stigler, 1980, pp. 660-641). Such a conclusion, 
as well as evidence supporting this observation (Teece, 1977), raises the question of 
whether the fabrication of knowledge can be easily separated from its dissemination, 
in terms of reproduction, in the first place.
The progressive elimination of time and space as relevant elements in the produc-
tion of knowledge has paradoxically injected the importance of time and location into 
the interpretation and use of (objectified) knowledge. Since the mere understanding 
and the validation process of knowledge cannot, except in rare circumstances, refer 
back to the original author(s) of the claim, the separation of social roles makes the 
interpretive tasks carried out by “experts” more crucial. Knowledge must be made 
available, interpreted, and linked to local, contingent circumstances. The complex-
ity of the linkages and the volume of the resources required to enact capacities for 
action delineate the limits of the power of scientific and technical knowledge. Such 
limits are an inevitable part of the fabrication of scientific knowledge and explain 
why, generally speaking, the knowledge work performed by the stratum of experts 
in knowledge-based occupations attains greater and greater centrality in advanced 
societies. The social prestige, authority and influence of experts are heightened, 
moreover, if their claim to expertise is uniquely coupled with access to additional 
knowledge (see Grundmann e Stehr, 2012). 
The centrality of knowledge-based occupations or, to use a narrower term, of 
experts in knowledge societies does not mean that we are on the way, as social 
theorists have feared in the past, to a technocratic society or a technical state. A tech-
nocratic model of society and its major social institutions, which “sees technicians 
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dominating officials and management, and which sees the modern technologically 
developed bureaucracies as governed by an exclusive reliance on a standard of effi-
ciency” (Gouldner, 1976, p. 257), be it a nightmare or a utopia, is a counterintuitive 
scenario. It is doubtful whether the crucial choices that modern societies will be 
forced to make are more about the technical means and less about the competing 
ends of social action. 
Quite a number of arguments can be deployed to demystify the threat of tech-
nocracy and a new ruling class made up of faceless experts. The most persuasive 
argument is social reality itself, which has failed to support the transformation of 
society in this direction. The long-predicted emergence of technocratic regimes has 
not materialized. The diagnosis of an imminent and menacing technocratic society 
was greatly overdrawn. 
Michel Crozier offers a less obvious argument about the limits of the power 
of experts, counselors and advisors in his study of the bureaucratic phenomenon. 
Crozier ([1963] 1964, p. 165) argues that the power of an expert is self-curtailing 
and self-defeating: 
The rationalization process gives him power, but the end results of rationalization curtail 
his power. As soon as a field is well covered, as soon as the first intuitions and innovations 
can be translated into rules and programs, the expert’s power disappears. As a matter of 
fact, experts have power only on the front line of progress – which means that they have a 
constantly shifting and fragile power.
The objectification and routinization of incremental knowledge curtails the 
power of knowledge. Yet knowledge assimilated to power is most likely incremental 
knowledge. Crozier’s vision of the “natural” limits of the power of experts, however, 
is still animated, if only implicitly, by the idea that experts – temporarily and ex-
clusively – command uncontested knowledge, that their clients fully trust expert 
knowledge, and that experts therefore do not get enmeshed in controversies.
But the growing importance of knowledge-based occupations in modern society 
does not mean that the trust of the public in experts, advisers and consultants (Miller, 
1983, pp. 90-93) is growing at the same pace or is not contingent on relationships 
(Wynne, 1992). On the contrary, we believe less and less in experts, although we 
employ them more and more. Yet without some element of trust in experts exhibited 
by ordinary members of society, expertise would vanish. 
Nonetheless, experts today are constantly involved in a remarkable number of 
controversies. The growing policy field of setting limits to the presence of certain 
ingredients in foodstuffs, of safety regulations, risk management, and hazard con-
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trol has had the side effect of ruining the reputation of experts. As long as an issue 
remains a contested matter, especially a publicly contented matter, the power and 
influence of experts and counter-experts is limited (see Nelkin, 1975, 1987); once a 
decision has been made and a question has been settled, the authority of experts also 
becomes almost uncontested. The work required to transform a contested matter 
into an uncontested matter is linked to the ability of experts to mobilize social and 
cultural resources in relevant contexts (see Limoges, 1993). 
How knowledge and its role are defined in a particular context is determined by 
individual actors as well as by the legal, economic, political, or religious constructs 
that have gained authority. Moreover, the nature of the interaction, whether private 
or public (see van den Daele, 1996), the issue or practices at hand, and the audi-
ences concerned are crucial in deciding what knowledge is mobilized and how it is 
enacted. Defining the role of knowledge is increasingly the job of experts, counselors, 
and advisors. The group of occupations designated here as experts, counselors and 
advisors is required to mediate between the complex distribution of knowledge 
that keeps changing and those who seek for knowledge. Ideas tend to travel as the 
baggage of people, as it were, whereas skills, in the sense of know-how and rules of 
thumb, are embodied or inscribed in them. Studies of innovation processes have 
shown how important the close coupling of social networks is for knowledge transfer 
as well as for the ultimate success of innovations in economic contexts; the studies 
indicate that the traffic of people within and among firms, for example, is crucial to 
the process of knowledge transfer (e.g. DeBresson e Amesse, 1991; Freeman, 1991; 
Callon, 1992; Faulkner, Senker e Velho, 1995).
A chain of interpretations must come to an “end” in order for knowledge to 
become relevant in practice and effective as a capacity for action. This function of 
putting an end to the process of reflection – or of healing the lack of immediate 
practicability that is inherent to scientific and technical knowledge as it emerges from 
the scientific community – for the purpose of action is largely performed by various 
groups of experts in modern society. Their societal prominence today is intimately 
related to the central role of knowledge for contemporary society.
But aside from the question of the nature of practical and additional knowledge, it 
is important to briefly reflect about what can only be called the uneven development 
of knowledge. For example, while we may well have a surplus of knowledge in fields 
such as bioengineering, weapons know-how, or psychological knowledge designed 
to manipulate and persuade by hidden means, there are pressing social, political or 
health issues that remain unsolved due to our lack of knowledge.
The differentiation between common sense or everyday knowledge and expert 
or scientific knowledge is the most frequent difference among forms of knowledge 
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that one typically encounters both in everyday life and in the scientific community. 
The difference is most often asymmetrical. Objective knowledge enhances and 
embellishes itself by pointing to the deficiencies of common-sense knowledge. The 
deficits of non-scientific knowledge are legion. Everyday knowledge is superficial, 
if not unreflective and false. In many analyses, as a result, the elevated social role 
of scientific and technological knowledge is almost invariably tied to its superior 
attributes. The deficiencies of common-sense knowledge, in turn, account for its 
inferior, if not declining, status and function in modern societies. But one certainly 
must wonder how it is that everyday knowledge, given such inherent deficiencies, 
has managed to survive in modern societies. In response, we do not want to collapse 
or dispense with the difference between everyday and scientific knowledge (see 
Shapin, 2001). But in contrast to the common-sense distinction between lay and 
expert knowledge, we want to make the case that the many characteristics that justify 
the rise of scientific knowledge above the multiple insufficiencies of common-sense 
knowledge are helpful in accounting for what is undoubtedly the greater social, 
intellectual and economic importance of scientific knowledge in modern societies.
Knowledge as a public good
Knowledge is perhaps the quintessential public good.
Peter Drahos (2004, p. 321)
One further consideration in our search for the price of knowledge relates to the 
claim that knowledge is, in the end, actually a public good. Should Peter Drahos’ 
thesis that knowledge is an essentially public good be correct, then the question of 
the price of knowledge (as a public good) can be answered promptly and, of course, 
correctly: knowledge is without a price.
Joseph Stiglitz (1999) describes why knowledge is not merely a public good but 
a global public good54. Most if not all discussions about knowledge as a public good 
are normative or political in nature since economists tend to strongly defend either 
the idea that knowledge should be available to all (for different reasons, obviously) 
or the idea that knowledge, for example additional knowledge, needs to be protected 
54. Joseph Stiglitz (1995) identified a total of five global public goods: “international economic stability, 
international security (political stability), the international environment, international humanitarian 
assistance and knowledge”. A definition of global public good that is not merely confined to identify-
ing examples of global public goods but also considers their availability concludes that “global public 
goods might usefully be defined as those goods (including policies and infrastructure) that are system-
atically underprovided by private market forces and for which such under-provision has important 
international externality effects” (Maskus e Reichman, 2004, p. 284).
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and hence carry a price tag (again for difference reasons but mainly to ensure that 
the propensity to generate additional knowledge is not being stifled). 
But first, what is a public good and why is the idea of a public good related to 
the issue of the price of a public good? Public goods are very diverse phenomena. 
Economists consider products/knowledge/services/ideas/information that are pro-
duced or available in a society to be public goods if access to them is not regulated 
and can in principle be shared by all members of a community. Street names, trust 
or safety are public goods. Public goods, therefore, emerge as a result of certain 
social norms (such as, for instance, peace, civic order, and good governance) or are 
physical phenomena (such as, for instance, carbon-absorbing forests or algae, air).
The price of private goods is negotiated in market places. Market places are also 
seen as the most efficient context for furthering the propensity to produce private 
goods. The propensity to produce is further secured by conditions extraneous to the 
market, for example, property or intellectual rights; producers rely on public goods or 
non-market goods such as the air to breathe, the climate, national defense, or gravity.
Public goods are freely available by definition, they are not subject to property 
rights, and their burdens or benefits cannot be restricted to an individual or a col-
lectivity. As far as their use or utility is concerned public goods are non-excludable. 
Moreover, the consumption of a public good is non-excludable if unauthorized actors 
(free-riders) cannot be prevented from enjoying the benefits or incurring the costs of 
being exposed to it. The non-excludability of a good, a service or an environmental 
condition is a contingent matter; for example, “it is easier to exclude individuals from 
the use of a bike than it is from national defense” (Drahos, 2004, p. 324).
If many individuals and organizations can enjoy a public good without depleting 
it and if its consumption or enjoyment does not come at another person’s expense, a 
public good is non-rival. From an individual perspective, the consumption of public 
goods carries no restrictions. A mathematical theorem “satisfies both attributes: if 
I teach you the theorem, I continue to enjoy the knowledge of the theorem at the 
same time that you do” (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 308). Once the theorem is published, no 
one can be excluded, anyone can utilize it. 
Joseph Stiglitz (1999, p. 309) also makes the point that the nonrivalrousness of 
knowledge implies, for example, that there is zero marginal cost for an additional 
individual or organization that benefits from available knowledge. Even if it would 
be possible to prevent someone from taking such knowledge on board, it would be 
undesirable to impose restrictions since there are no marginal costs associated with 
sharing the benefits that come with the knowledge in question. 
Conflating knowledge and information, Stiglitz (1999, p. 309) argues that “if 
information is to be efficiently utilized, it cannot be privately provided because ef-
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ficiency implies charging a price of zero – the marginal cost of another individual 
enjoying the knowledge”. However, as Stiglitz is quick to add, “at zero price only 
knowledge that can be produced at zero cost will be produced”. In this case, private 
markets “would not provide them at all or would do so at deficient levels relative to 
those demanded by citizens” (Maakus e Reichman, 2004, p. 284). Hence, the prob-
ability that additional knowledge will be generated is also close to zero. If additional 
knowledge is without price, the supply of new knowledge will dry up. The idea that 
the acquisition of new knowledge comes at no cost of course describes an ideal typical 
condition. After all, the actual transmission and acquisition of additional knowledge 
requires some resources, however small or significant. 
Nonexcludability also has implications for the price of knowledge. Since such 
knowledge is available to everyone, the price would approach zero. We have already 
discussed patents and intellectual property rights as ways of restricting the number 
of users. Depending on the legal frame of patenting, the patent application makes a 
considerable “amount” of the relevant innovation publicly accessible. Whether this 
knowledge can in fact be appropriated is not dependent on its mere availability, however. 
The probability of fabricating incremental knowledge and enjoying the economic 
advantages that flow from such knowledge is, of course, a stratified and contingent 
process. Within technological regimes, techno-economic networks (Freeman, 1991; 
Callon, 1992)55 or theoretical “paradigms”, the advantage goes to those who already 
have produced, and therefore command, significant elements of incremental knowl-
edge. Technological regimes or paradigms may be embedded within a company or 
in a network of firms, research institutes, etc. In analogy to Merton’s observations 
about the operation of the Matthew principle in the process of accumulating repu-
tation and prestige in science, it is possible to stipulate a similar principle for the 
stratification of incremental knowledge. Generating incremental knowledge is likely 
to be easier for those who can disproportionately benefit from what they already 
know; for example, due to the capacity of combining local and global knowledge 
(Stiglitz, 1999, pp. 317-318).
The competitive advantages that may accrue to individuals or firms that gener-
ate and manage to control incremental knowledge is, without question, limited 
in terms of time, especially but not only due to the time limits of the protection 
granted by patents or copyrights. Thus, such companies must continuously strive 
55. Michel Callon (1992, p. 73) defines techno-economic networks as a “coordinated set of 
heterogeneous actors – for instance, public laboratories, centres for technical research, com-
panies, financial organizations, users and the government – who participate collectively in 
the conception, development, production and distribution or diffusion of procedures for 
producing goods and services, some of which give rise to market transactions”.
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to stay ahead in the fabrication of knowledge56: “Once they are imitated and their 
outputs standardized, then there are downward wage and employment pressures” 
(Storper, 1996, p. 257) as well as a decline in profitability57.
In contrast to incremental knowledge, the general, mundane and routinized 
stock of knowledge consists mostly of knowledge that is non-rival as well as non-
excludable, that is, these forms of knowledge may very well constitute public goods58. 
But even the general mundane stock of knowledge is hardly ever completely exclud-
able or without rivalry, be it based either on legal norms or on some other apparatus 
in which it may be inscribed, preventing its use by others. From a collective point 
of view, for example from the perspective of all consumers or a community, the use 
of public goods, as noted early (see Hume [1739] 1961; Hardin, 1968), may give 
rise to the free-rider problem. 
It might be useful to distinguish between pure public goods and quasi-public 
or impure public goods. Quasi-public goods would refer to conditions of action, 
for example, from which a consumer or an employer benefits even though she has 
not carried most of the cost of the asset. The publicly accessible infrastructure of a 
country would be an example, or an employee’s training and education that is not 
entirely paid for by the employer but nonetheless of great benefit to the corporation.
As Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (1999, p. xx) point out, financial 
stability has “public good qualities. A bank or financial institution can generate much 
profit through risky lending. All it stands to loose is its capital if it fails. But in a com-
plex and interdependent financial system, the cost of a single institution defaulting are 
much higher – often a multiple – because one default can lead to more failures and 
56. Existing or new companies can bring innovative products to the market and thus displace the prod-
ucts of competitors; or companies active in the market can improve their own products. A study by 
Daniel Garcia-Macia and colleagues (2016) shows that the much greater increase in employment 
(in the usa) is the result of the innovative activities of existing companies, in particular through the 
improvement of products. The improvement of production is therefore at least in this respect (and 
relatively short term) more important than the creative destruction of products.
57. William Starbuck’s (1992, p. 716) definition of a knowledge-intensive firm resonates with 
these observations about the function of incremental knowledge since he stresses “exception-
al and valuable expertise” rather than the possession of knowledge per se as constitutive of 
knowledge-intensive firms: “If one defines knowledge broadly to encompass what everybody 
knows, every firm can appear knowledge-intensive”. However, these broad designations do 
not as yet represent operational measures of incremental knowledge or exceptional expertise.
58. These characteristics of knowledge allow for a decoupling of the “cost” of the fabrication of 
knowledge from the benefits that accrue to those who use it. As a result, the non-rival and 
non-excludable attributes of knowledge constitute a disincentive to invest in the produc-
tion of knowledge (see Dosi, 1996, p. 83). Geroski (1995, pp. 94-100) discusses various 
strategies that might be instrumental in overcoming the appropriability problem of incre-
mental knowledge.
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defaults”. Technically, such a possibility is known as a case of negative externalities. But 
it is better known as a way of socializing costs. In the case of what is seen as global public 
goods, the costs and benefits, the externalities, are shared or borne across the world. 
Capital as embodied knowledge
A final pathway in our exploration of finding a way of measuring the price of 
knowledge is to turn to the prominent idea within economics asserting that capi-
tal goods as opposed to financial or human capital are embodied knowledge (see 
Baetjer, 2000, p. 148). 
The idea that capital, especially in the form of capital goods, is knowledge or at 
least is partly embodied knowledge, is more than doubtful. For the aquisition of 
financial and human capital includes knowledge. In many cases one could assert 
that the aquisition of financial capital and human capital incorporates knowledge 
to a greater degree than would be the case with many capital goods. Derivatives as 
financial goods are based on knowledge in the same manner as the intellectual capaci-
ties of an employer. For this reason, Gary Becker (Becker, Murphy e Tamura, 1994, 
p. 326) defines human capital as: “[people] embodied knowledge and skills, and 
economic development depends on advances in technological and scientific knowl-
edge, development presumably depends on the accumulation of human capital”.
That capital is embodied knowledge can already be found explicitly in a plausible 
example in Adam Smith’s An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
In this volume, Adam Smith (p. 14) offers a clear example of how an idea enters into 
the construction of capital equipment (“frozen knowledge” [Boulding, 1996, pp. 
5-6]), in this instance the early development of the steam engines. Concretely is an 
insight that becomes part of the design and hence the production of the engine; a 
design feature that makes the steam engine as a tool more efficient: 
[…] a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the 
boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, 
who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the 
valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open 
and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his playfellows. 
The observation by Adam Smith is generalized by members of the Austrian 
School of Economics; Carl Menger ([1871] 1981, p. 74) for example emphasizes: 
“The quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the 
extent of human knowledge of the causal connections between things, and by the 
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extent of human control over these things”. From the basic observation of knowledge 
as knowledge incorporated into capital goods to a determination of the value of 
this knowledge, it is obviously a distant and complicated path which may not in 
the end lead to the desired goal. From the conventional terminology of economic 
theory it is very easy to infer the conclusion, as for example R. Harrod (1939, p. 
18) underlines that the value of the capital can be determined relatively easily: the 
“actual saving in a period […] is equal to the addition to the capital stock”. Joan 
Robinson (1979, p. 100) in contrast is equally convinced that “no one ever makes 
it clear how capital is to be measured”. 
Without wishing to extend the discussion further, one can conclude with Howard 
Baetjer (2000, p. 169) that the value of the capital and thus the value of capital goods 
ultimately is not exactly measurable. And as long as it is difficult to determine the 
exact value of capital assets, it is clear that the value of the incorporated knowledge 
(as a part of such assets or products) is also not sufficiently determinable.
The general conclusion of the failure to discover the price of knowledge can be 
specified more precisely: (1) Incorporated knowledge can not only be very hetero-
geneous but also “invisible” (tacit knowledge). (2) Is it necessary to ask if knowledge 
stands in a symmetrical manner to other resources that constitute a capital good? (3) 
How to establish a relationship between other resources (or products) and knowledge 
in order to determine how much the share of knowledge is in the aggregate product? 
(4) How do we assess knowledge that has been incorporated at different temporal 
phases into production? (5) What is the value of knowledge given the loss of value 
of knowledge over a certain period of time and how can the loss of value (or profit) 
be determined? (5) If the value of a capital good is set in relation to its production 
output, these questions cannot be solved. (6) What is the effect of the complemen-
tary interaction of investment goods in production on the value of knowledge? (7) 
What is the importance of learning processes, including the learning of learning 
for the valuation of the capital goods, for example, in the case of software and thus 
knowledge? (8) Labor and capital form a (hybrid) unity in many economic contexts. 
What significance does this unit have for the value of knowledge?
Conclusion: determining the price of knowledge
Our investigation of how to put a “price” on knowledge interrogated various 
social science and practical perspectives for their usefulness in arriving at some arith-
metic for determining the value of knowledge. Even if one tries to stick to established, 
manifest proxies of this somewhat opaque problem, it becomes increasingly clear 
how formidably obfuscated the matter presents itself, thus perhaps only emphasiz-
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ing the strong suspicion of many observers that knowledge simply cannot have or 
does not come with a price. It is not surprising therefore that the oecd (2006, p. 5) 
concludes its elaborate search for a way to quantify and measure “intangible assets” 
with the sensible recommendation that such assets including of course knowledge 
are “best dealt with through narrative financial reporting” (emphasis added).
We hope to have demonstrated, along the lines of our prior work on a sociological 
conception of knowledge, that knowledge, unless it is conveniently conflated with 
the category of information, is (1) embodied and thus hard to divorce from its car-
riers; (2) deeply entrenched in questions of social relations and thus stratification, 
both as a resource for other ‘goods’ as well as a ‘product’ of social circumstances; (3) 
does indeed play an ever greater role within as well as across (national) economies, 
but unfortunately in a manner that is anything but straight-forward; and that (4) 
the situation becomes even more complicated once these three dimension of our 
inquiry become entangled in a stand-off between individual, economic and public 
relevancies regarding the role and benefits of knowledge
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Abstract
The price of knowledge
This article addresses the apparently rather old question as the citation from the 1851 issue of 
the Scientific American indicates – of how to assess and measure the value or price of knowledge. 
We will probe the issue from a variety of social scientific and practical perspectives. Against the 
background of a sociological concept of knowledge economic, political, social and juridical 
perspectives are discussed that may lead us to a price of knowledge.
Keywords: Value of knowledge; Patents; Intangibles; Public goods; Price of knowledge; Human 
capital; Modern economy.
Resumo
O preço do conhecimento
O artigo aborda uma questão aparentemente antiga, como sugere a citação inicial tomada à 
edição de 1891 da revista Scientific American, de como avaliar e medir o valor ou o preço do 
conhecimento. A questão será estudada de várias perspectivas, tanto da prática como das ciências 
sociais. Tomando por base um conceito sociológico de conhecimento, discutiremos as perspectivas 
econômica, social, política e jurídica que podem nos conduzir à noção de preço do conhecimento.
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